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Suppose that we identify physical objects, in the first instance, by extension, as things 
like stones, tables, trees, people and other animals: the persisting macroscopic 
constituents of the world in which we live. Of course, there is a substantive question 
of what it is to be like such things in the way relevant to categorization as a physical 
object. So this can hardly be the final word on the matter. Still, it is equally clear that 
this gives us all a perfectly respectable initial conception of what we are talking 
about; and it is an entirely adequate starting point for what follows. 
 
Reflection on the history of epistemological and metaphysical discussions of 
perception, especially through the early modern period, shows philosophers struggling 
in practice to combine two intuitively compelling ideas about physical objects and our 
relation with them in perception. 
 
1.  Physical objects are the very things that we are presented with in 
perceptual experience, in the sense that perceptual experience thereby 
provides us with at least a rough provisional conception of what physical 
objects are. I call this basic idea empiricism. 
 
2.  Physical objects themselves are mind-independent, in the sense that the 
nature of such things is entirely independent of their appearance, and not  
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in any way a matter of how they do or might appear to anyone. I call this 
basic idea realism.
1 
 
I call the conjunction of the two empirical realism. 
 
Locke (1975) notoriously attempts to secure empirical realism indirectly. Perceptual 
experience consists in our direct acquaintance with mind-dependent entities. Still, 
these sufficiently resemble the distinct mind-independent physical objects that are 
normally their cause– there is resemblance in primary qualities at least – that we may 
nevertheless acquire a conception of what physical objects are through perception. 
Berkeley (1975a, 1975b) equally notoriously rejects this purported combination, 
effectively arguing from empiricism against realism. Crudely, if, as empiricism 
contends, perception provides us with a conception of what physical objects are, then 
these must indeed stand in some appropriate resemblance relation with the mind-
dependent entities that we are acquainted with directly in such experience; but “an 
idea can be like nothing but an idea” (Berkeley, 1975b, § 8); hence physical objects 
must themselves be likewise mind-dependent. 
 
                                                 
1 I mean by the nature of the entities of a given kind here the most fundamental 
answer to the question what such things are. This is of course a contentious notion. I 
take it for granted here without argument and without committing myself to any 
specific philosophical elaboration. The justification I offer for doing so rests on the 
merits of what follows within this framework. For a helpful and sympathetic 
historically informed elucidation of this notion of an object’s nature, see Wiggins 
(1995). For a highly influential further development of his own position, see Wiggins 
(2001). Charles (2000) elaborates the Aristotelian source of these ideas with great 
force and illumination. Strawson (1959) contains important motivation for the modern 
relevance of the notion. Ayers (1991, esp. parts I & III) offers an alternative 
development to Wiggins that focuses more directly on the idea of the nature of 
physical objects in general as causally integrated enduring and spatially extended 
material unities. Although I intend to remain neutral on this here, I am myself more 
persuaded by Ayers’ position. See also Campbell (2002, esp. ch. 4).  
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This line of objection to the Lockean indirect empirical realist combination seems to 
be confirmed by Rae Langton’s (1998) reconstruction of Kant’s transcendental 
idealism (1929), according to which perception in principle fails to afford us 
knowledge of any of the intrinsic properties of mind-independent physical objects 
themselves. So the idea that we grasp what such things are through perception, since 
this discloses their nature at least as bearers of primary qualities, is again indefensible. 
Berkeley’s accusation that introducing a domain of mind-independent causes of our 
experience at best changes the subject from the nature of the genuine physical objects 
that we all know and love is quite just. For this procedure results in a theoretical 
postulation of intrinsically unknowable physical objects as the causes we know not 
what of such and such experiential effects in us. Thus, retaining realism certainly 
appears to be in some tension with empiricism. 
 
Of course there is a great deal going on here; and I certainly do not wish to endorse 
everything involved in these various considerations against a straightforward 
combination of realism with empiricism. I offer these familiar moves rather as a 
historical illustration of a prima facie tension that I take as my starting point. 
 
My plan in what follows is to pursue a specific version of this traditional problem in 
some detail. This version of the problem centres on the commonsense assumption that 
we may explain the actual and counterfactual order and nature of our perceptual 
experience of physical objects by appeal to the prior and independent nature of the 
physical objects themselves that we perceive. Thinking of physical objects as entities 
whose nature explains our experience in this way plays a crucial role in securing their 
status as mind-independent in the sense required for realism. I spell out exactly what I  
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think this status consists in and explain how the commonsense explanatory 
assumption secures it. 
 
On its most familiar interpretation and development, though, this assumption that we 
explain the order and nature of our perceptual experience physical objects by appeal 
the nature of the physical objects themselves raises a serious problem. For it threatens 
the basic empiricist idea that we are genuinely presented with those mind-independent 
physical objects themselves in perceptual experience, that it is through our experience 
of them that we acquire a rough and provisional conception at least of what mind-
independent physical objects are. 
 
I argue that this threat may be avoided by resisting the orthodox development of the 
realist’s explanatory strategy that effectively began with Locke. The assumption that 
we may explain the actual and counterfactual order and nature of our perceptual 
experience of physical objects by appeal to the prior and independent nature of the 
physical objects themselves that we perceive succeeds in securing realism without 
threatening empiricism provided that we respect the autonomous standing of our 
everyday commonsense explanations of experience. These are in no need of any 
fundamental scientific revision in such a way as to undermine empiricism. 
 
The paper has two parts. First, I elaborate the explanatory assumption, explain in 
detail its role in securing the mind-independence of the physical objects that we 
perceive, and outline the threat that the orthodox development of this strategy poses to 
the presentation of those very objects to us in experience. Second, I suggest how this 
threat should be avoided. I argue that there is a perfectly adequate interpretation of the  
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explanatory assumption that secures the status of physical objects as mind-
independent without in any way threatening the idea that these are the very things that 
are subjectively presented to us in perception. 
 
I 
 
We ordinarily cite the properties of physical objects in explanation of the actual and 
counterfactual order and nature of our perceptual experience of those very things. In 
vision, for example, we regularly give explanations along the following lines. 
 
(E1)  The coin looks circular to Janet because it is circular and she is viewing it 
from head on. 
 
(E2)  The coin looks elliptical to John because it is circular and he is viewing it from 
an angle. 
 
(E3)  The coin would look elliptical to Janet if she were to change her point of view 
because it is circular and she would then be viewing it from an angle. 
 
(E4)  The jumper looks red outdoors because it is red and lighting conditions are 
normal outdoors. 
 
(E5)  It looks mauve in the store because it is red and the lighting conditions are 
artificially dingy the store. 
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(E6)  It would look red if the lights in the store were improved because it is red and 
it would then look its actual colour. 
 
I contend that our offering and accepting such explanations constitutes a commitment 
to realism about the physical objects that they cite. For, first, realism consists in a 
certain priority of the natures of physical objects themselves over the perceptual 
appearances to which they may give rise; and, second, the explanatory standing of 
such explanations depends upon this very priority. I elaborate each of these two points 
in turn. 
 
First, let us begin with the familiar distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities, for example, between the shapes and colours of physical objects 
respectively (Locke, 1975). It is hardly uncontroversial how best to draw this 
distinction. The approach that both seems to me faithful to the key historical 
arguments in the area and is in any case most useful for my purposes here 
characterizes this as a distinction between the relation that the relevant properties of 
physical objects bear to the perceptual appearances to which they may give rise in the 
two cases. I call this the standard account.
2 
 
Thus, the most basic distinctions concerning secondary qualities are between, say, 
red-type and green-type appearances, and the rest, conceived quite independently of 
the question of what their worldly correlates, if any, may be. The characterization of 
such appearances is prior to, and independent of, any characterization of the worldly 
                                                 
2 I should say that I do not myself endorse the following characterization of secondary 
qualities and our perceptions of them. See Campbell (1993) for an alternative that I 
prefer. This will become relevant later with my inclusion of the colour explanations 
(E4)-(E5) alongside shape explanations (E1)-(E3) throughout.  
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properties that may in some way be presented or indicated by them. Having given 
such a characterization, of red-type appearances, say, we may then define a property – 
redness – which applies to mind-independent objects, as that of being disposed to 
produce those kinds of appearances – red-type ones – or, alternatively, as the property 
of having whatever underlying physical constitution happens in the actual world to 
ground that disposition. 
 
In contrast, the most basic distinctions concerning the primary qualities are those 
between, say, squareness and circularity, and the rest, as properties of mind-
independent things themselves, conceived quite independently of the question of what 
appearances, if any, they might produce. Having first identified which property 
squareness is, we can then identify square-type appearances as those that present 
something as having that property – squareness. So, the relevant appearances are to be 
characterized only by appeal to a prior, and independent, characterization of the 
worldly properties that they may present. 
 
Generalizing this basic idea, I claim that the mind-independence of the objects that we 
perceive consists in the individuative priority of their nature over the various 
appearance properties that show up in our perception of them. So an account of our 
perceptual experience of physical objects preserves realism if and only if it offers a 
characterization the nature of physical objects themselves as the prior and 
independent basis on which it goes on to give a characterizations of the relevant 
appearances that such objects may present in perception. 
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It is natural to object to this whole approach that priority of characterization is one 
thing, metaphysical status quite another. The first is a matter of how we identify the 
phenomena in question; the second is a matter of the nature of those phenomena 
themselves. Indeed, the standard account of secondary qualities outlined above surely 
serves to make just this point. Suppose that we do first of all characterize the red-type 
appearances, as specific conscious experiential phenomena, conceived quite 
independently of the question of what their worldly correlates, if any, may be; and 
suppose that we do then go on derivatively to characterize the redness of physical 
objects as their possession of whatever underlying physical constitution happens in 
the actual world to ground the disposition to produce such red-type appearances in 
normal subjects under normal circumstances. Then an object’s possession of that 
underlying physical property, whichever it may be, is a perfectly mind-independent 
matter. It is entirely independent of the way in which it does or might appear to 
anyone. Thus, although the redness of physical objects is characterized only on the 
basis of a prior characterization of the experiential appearances to which it gives rise, 
the property itself is perfectly mind-independent. 
 
In reply I admit entirely that there is a mind-independent property here: whichever 
underlying physical property it is that turns out actually to ground objects’ disposition 
to produce red-type appearances in normal subject under normal circumstances. The 
crucial point, though, is that this is absolutely not the property that such objects are 
subjectively presented as having in our perceptual experience of their colour. For we 
have no idea whatsoever which property this underlying physical property is on the 
basis of our perception of it on the standard account of secondary qualities in 
question. Put the other way around: the property – if any – that physical objects are  
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presented as having in our colour experience, on this view, is not mind-independent, 
but rather a mind-dependent one. Suppose that colour appearances were quite 
conceived differently. Suppose, that is to say, that they were correctly characterized as 
presentations of specific properties of things not themselves individuated by any 
reference to their appearances, as appearances of squareness are characterized 
according to the standard account of primary qualities above as presentations of a 
specific geometric shape. This is in my view the correct account of colour 
appearances, although it is of course quite contrary to the standard account currently 
under consideration here by way of illustration of the notion of mind-dependence in 
play. In that case the colour properties presented in perception would indeed be mind-
independent. But this is precisely what is not the case on the standard account. 
 
I conclude that this standard account of the distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities in fact serves strongly to confirm my criterion of mind-
independence. The mind-independence of the objects that are presented in perception 
consists in the individuative priority of their nature over the various appearance 
properties that show up in our perception of them.
3 
 
Second, the explanatory standing of our ordinary explanations of the order and nature 
of perceptual experience on the basis of the nature of the physical objects themselves 
that we perceive depends upon precisely this individuative priority of objects over 
appearances. For suppose that the individuative priority were the reverse, as in the 
standard account of secondary qualities given above. In that case, purportedly 
                                                 
3 The key claims involved in this illustration from the standard account of the 
primary/secondary quality distinction, and especially the crucial role of empiricism as 
defined above, return at the heart of the main argument of section II below.  
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explanatory ascriptions of properties of physical objects are in reality ascriptions of 
properties essentially characterized in terms of the disposition to produce such and 
such appearances in normal subjects under normal circumstances. Thus the resultant 
explanations of those very appearances are either unsatisfying or mere placeholders 
for genuine explanations in quite different terms that re-establish the individuative 
priority with properties of objects independent and prior to any question of their 
appearances. Simply being told that something appears a certain way because it is 
disposed to do so gives us no substantive understanding why it appears as it does 
without some indication of what grounds the relevant disposition. Articulating this 
ground, along with the general law that things that are so constituted normally appear 
thus and so, does provide an explanation; but only by citing a grounding constitution 
that is characterized prior to and independently of any question as to what 
appearances, if any, things so constituted may produce. Thus the genuine explanatory 
standing of explanations of perceptual appearances depends upon an individuative 
priority of the explanatory properties of physical objects over the appearances to be 
explained. 
 
It is sometimes said that the relation between certain perceptible properties of 
physical objects and the appearances that these present in perception is one of no 
straightforward priority either way (McDowell, 1985). I find it difficult to articulate 
the proposal fully; but the essential outline is as follows. On the basis of certain 
experiences that we have, we are able directly to sort various objects into groups, 
without, as it were, paying any heed to the nature of the experiences that provide our 
cues to do so. We may call the relevant groups of objects ‘red’, green’ and so on. 
Reflecting on this capacity for object categorization, we may go on to sort our  
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experiential cues into groups also, characterizing these in turn as appearances of red, 
appearances of green, and so on. Thus there is an epistemological priority, on the 
subject’s part at least, from the colour properties of objects to their colour 
appearances. Still, there is nothing ‘in reality’ that unifies all the red objects other 
than their disposition normally to produce appearances of red in us. These 
appearances are unified metaphysically as single kind in virtue of their intrinsic 
subjective type, entirely independently of the question of what their worldly 
correlates, if any, may be; and this in turn, and derivatively, imposes a metaphysical 
unity on the red physical objects, as those disposed to produce such appearances in 
normal subjects under normal circumstances.  Thus there is a metaphysical priority 
from colour appearances to the colour properties of objects. There is no 
straightforward single priority either way. 
 
If this really were a view on which there is no individuative priority of the relevant 
kind either way between the perceptible properties of physical objects and the various 
appearance properties that show up in our perception of them, then my argument 
above would fail. For I conclude that our explanations of perceptual appearances by 
their objects depend upon an individuative priority from objects to appearances from 
the fact that they are incompatible with an individuative priority from appearances to 
objects. I ignore the possibility of any genuinely no-priority view. Fortunately the 
position outlined above is categorically not a no-priority view of this threatening kind. 
For the primary unification is at the level of appearances, in the characterization of 
which subjective condition is that of something ‘looking red’, say, only on the basis 
of which is it then possible to characterize the corresponding property of physical 
objects themselves: being red. So, regardless of the epistemological claims, about our  
- 12 - 
capacity for sorting coloured objects in advance of sorting their colour appearances, 
there is a clear individuative priority of the relevant kind from appearances to objects. 
The point is confirmed by the fact that any genuinely mind-independent unity that 
there may be to the objects sorted as red, say, on this view, is not the unity that those 
things are subjectively presented as having. For we have no idea whatsoever what this 
may be on the basis of our perception of them. So this position is a definitively an 
instance of the order of individuative priority characteristic of the standard account of 
secondary qualities given above.  
 
Indeed it is difficult to see how there possibly could be a genuinely no-priority view 
of the kind required to block my argument. For what it is to be an appearances of F-
ness must in general have something to do with what it is to be F. I offer two 
possibilities: being F is characterized in terms of appearing F (as in the case of the 
standard account of secondary qualities); or appearing F is characterized in terms of 
being F (as in the case of the standard account of primary qualities). A no-priority 
view must presumably either endorse neither of these claims or endorse both of them. 
If it endorses neither, then the worry is that appearing F and being F fail to be related 
to each other in any way that is adequate to sustain the prima facie impression that ‘F’ 
is being used without equivocation between them. If it endorses both, then the danger 
is that the resultant circularity will obstruct any attempt to distinguish the two pairs 
being F and appearing F, on the one hand, and being G and appearing G, on the other, 
for any F and G of the same general type – e.g. colours. Thus in the absence of any 
clearly articulated candidate for a genuinely no-priority view, I contend that my 
argument goes through. 
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To reiterate my second key point about explanations of perceptual appearances by 
appeal to the physical objects that we perceive then, their explanatory standing 
depends upon the individuative priority of the natures of the physical objects 
themselves over the perceptual appearances to be explained. 
 
Putting this together with the constitutive account of mind-independence, in terms of 
precisely such individuative priority, it follows that the explanatory standing of our 
explanations of the order and nature of our perceptual experience of physical objects 
on the basis of the nature of the physical objects themselves that we perceive delivers 
a clear positive verdict on the status of physical objects as mind-independent. 
Offering and accepting such explanations constitutes a commitment to realism about 
physical objects. Call this the Explanatory Strategy (ES) for vindicating realism. The 
key claim is that we sustain realism concerning physical objects by thinking of 
physical objects themselves as the explanatory grounds of our various perceptual 
experiences of those very things from different points of view and in different 
circumstances of perception. 
 
(ES) raises a serious problem, though. For it is prima facie plausible to accept the best 
scientific-physical theories as providing essential substantive revisions to our initial 
commonsense explanations (E1)-(E6) of our perceptual experience by appeal to the 
physical objects that we perceive. Thus, we may be inclined to appeal ultimately to 
fundamental scientific-physics for the complete and correct articulation of such 
explanations. Call this the scientific implementation of (ES). 
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On this way of thinking, the correct and genuinely explanatory explanations of the 
actual and counterfactual order and nature of our perceptual experience of physical 
objects are to be given only in the language of fundamental scientific-physics. This in 
turn determines the natures of the objects whose mind-independence is thereby 
secured by (ES). For these are the entities whose natures are explanatorily relevant in 
such fundamental scientific-physical explanations. Thus, insofar as their mind-
independence is secured by (ES), physical objects are mereological sums, over 
regions of space and time, or perhaps some other kind of composition, of whatever 
turn out to be the most basic elements of the correct fundamental scientific-physical 
theory. 
 
The theoretical conception that most of us have of what such things are actually like is 
no doubt very primitive. Indeed, Lewis (forthcoming) presents a powerful argument 
for the claim that we are irremediably ignorant of the intrinsic natures of their 
fundamental scientific-physical components. In any case, it is quite clear that these 
are not the very things that we are presented with in perception. For, as I explicated 
the notion at the outset, perceptual presentation provides us with at least a rough and 
provisional conception of what the objects are with which we are presented; and we 
have no conception whatsoever of what the most fundamental scientific-physical 
primitives are simply on the basis of perception. So we have no conception 
whatsoever of what any simple mereological sum or composition of such things might 
be either. The objects whose mind-independence is secured by the current scientific 
implementation of (ES) are therefore not subjectively presented to us in perception. 
Thus, the scientific implementation of (ES) is incompatible with empiricism as 
defined above.  
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This consequence should be resisted if at all possible for two reasons. First, as I said 
at the outset, empiricism is intuitively highly compelling. We come to these issues 
with the strong conviction that we are presented with mind-independent physical 
objects in perception in just this sense. Second, and more importantly, empiricism 
plays a fundamental role is setting the domain for the most important and contested 
philosophical controversy concerning realism as I envisage it from the start. The 
physical objects whose status is at stake here are precisely those things that are 
subjectively presented to us in experience. Preserving realism at the cost of 
distinguishing mind-independent physical objects from the stones, tables, trees, 
people and other animals that we all know and love is a hollow victory indeed for the 
realist. 
 
At this stage, then, with only the scientific implementation of (ES) in view, it looks 
rather as though Berkeley (1975a, 1975b) must be right in his contention that the only 
conceivable form of realism involves changing the subject matter entirely from the 
physical objects with which we are presented in perception. For those things – the 
things whose metaphysical status is our initial and primary concern – perhaps we 
really must accept some kind of anti-realism. 
 
II 
 
I shall now argue that this threat may be overcome. (ES) is absolutely the right 
strategy for securing realism. The unacceptable consequence of undermining 
empiricism that follows from its scientific implementation may however be avoided.  
- 16 - 
It is correct to secure metaphysical realism concerning physical objects by thinking of 
physical objects themselves as the explanatory grounds of our various perceptual 
experiences of those very things from different points of view and in different 
circumstances of perception. It is a mistake, though, to look to fundamental scientific-
physical explanation to provide and characterize what are therefore 
phenomenologically mysterious targets of this identification. The key lies, instead, in 
our initial commonsense-physical explanations themselves, which I claim are in 
excellent standing absolutely as they are, in no need of any scientific-physical 
revision. 
 
Thus, the scientific-physical option outlined above, and incompatible with 
empiricism, is not the only possible implementation of (ES). An alternative 
commonsense implementation is available that preserves empiricism and is also in my 
view a perfectly stable and adequate defence of realism. The truth and explanatory 
standing of our initial commonsense-physical explanations of perceptual appearances 
as they stand is sufficient to secure realism for the physical objects that are presented 
to us in perception. Furthermore these commonsense-physical explanations are in 
absolutely no need of any substantive revision and correction by anything from 
scientific-physics. For they have features that any purported scientific-physical 
explanations of perceptual appearances lack that are crucially relevant to precisely 
this project of securing empirical realism. These features simultaneously establish the 
autonomous explanatory standing of commonsense-physical explanations and avoid 
the unacceptable anti-empiricist consequences that come with the move to scientific-
physics in defence of realism. 
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To begin with, then, recall that commonsense-physical explanations of the actual and 
counterfactual order and nature of our perceptual experience of physical by appeal to 
the familiar perceptible natures of those very things, along with our point of view and 
other relevant circumstances of perception, depend upon the individuative priority of 
the natures of the physical objects presented in perception themselves relative to their 
various appearances. For the latter appearances are explicitly individuated in terms of 
the prior natures of the physical objects that they present. Thus, in my toy examples, 
the explananda visual appearances are individuated explicitly in terms of the shape 
and colour properties they (apparently) present: as the coin’s looking circular or 
elliptical, and the jumper’s looking red or mauve. As we saw above in connection 
with the standard account of secondary qualities, if the order of individuative priority 
were the reverse, then insofar as the offered explanations point to anything genuinely 
explanatory this would inevitably proceed in terms of imperceptible grounding 
properties of the physical objects in question. The definitive feature of commonsense-
physical explanations, that these appeal precisely to the familiar perceptible natures of 
physical objects in explaining their perceptual appearances, would be lost entirely. 
 
Most importantly at this stage of the argument, commonsense-physical explanations 
of the order and nature of perceptual experience by appeal to the perceptible 
properties of the physical objects have two distinctive features that make them far 
superior for the purpose of vindicating empirical realism to anything available at the 
level of scientific-physical explanation. What I call their explanatory robustness 
avoids the purported need for any scientific-physical revision of commonsense-
physical explanations in connection with securing realism on the basis of (ES). The 
particular priority relation between the natures of the physical objects that constitute  
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the explanantia of such explanations and the appearances that are their explananda 
ensure in contrast with the scientific implementation of (ES) considered above that 
empiricism is preserved. I take these two points in turn. 
 
First, in comparison with any candidate scientific-physical explanations of perceptual 
appearances, commonsense-physical explanations are robust. That is to say, they 
maximize modal correlation with the perceptual appearances they explain in the 
following sense. All other things being equal, objects with quite different scientific-
physical properties that share the same commonsense-physical properties will appear 
in the same way; and what unifies the various respects in which their scientific-
physical properties might differ in such a way as to alter these appearances is 
precisely that these are precisely those scientific-physical variations that significantly 
alter the commonsense explanatory properties in question. 
 
By way of illustration from a related area independent of perceptual appearances, 
compare Putnam’s (1978) famous observation that the best explanation of the fact that 
a given one inch square peg passes through a one inch square hole and not through a 
one inch round hole is given by citing its size and shape. All other things being equal, 
it is precisely this property – one inch squareness – whose presence facilitates, and 
absence obstructs, its passage. Any proposed move in the direction of scientific-
physical explanation by appeal to lattices of elementary particles and the like reduces 
this robust modal generality. For one inch square pegs of quite different materials 
equally pass through a one inch square hole and not through a one inch round hole, 
regardless of the fact that the scientific-physical properties involved in explanation of 
their motion and interaction are quite different; and whatever their scientific-physical  
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differences may be – within reason
4 – appropriately sized pegs that are not square will 
not pass through a one inch square hole, and square pegs greater than one inch in side 
will not do so either. Thus, all other things being equal, the scientific-physical 
differences between pegs that do, and pegs that do not, pass through a one inch square 
hole but not through a one inch round hole, are explanatorily unified as those in which 
the peg is one inch square versus those in which it is not. This is what I mean by the 
explanatory virtue of robustness. 
 
Similarly, in connection with the explanations of our perceptual experience of 
physical objects that are central to (ES), commonsense-physical explanations are 
robust in comparison with scientific-physical explanations. The most robust 
explanation of why a coin looks circular to Janet viewing it head on and elliptical to 
John viewing it from a specific angle is given by citing its stable circular shape and 
not by appeal to they way in which its fundamental scientific-physical properties 
affect their respective perceptual systems. For, other things being equal, similarly 
circular objects of quite different materials look equally circular and elliptical 
respectively, to them and to other observers, from these same points of view, 
regardless of the fact that what is going on in scientific-physical terms may be quite 
different; and the scientific-physical changes to such objects that would alter these 
appearances are precisely those that significantly affect the commonsense-physical 
explanatory shape. This, rather than anything specific at the scientific-physical level is 
what unifies the objects that look circular and elliptical from these respective points of 
view as against those that do not. Thus, commonsense-physical explanations of such 
appearances have the explanatory virtue of robustness. 
                                                 
4 Excluding, for example, pegs made of material that dissolves the sides of the hole 
and so on.  
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Again, I contend, the most robust explanation of why a jumper looks red outdoors and 
mauve in the store is given by citing its red colour and the relevant variation between 
normal and artificially dingy lighting conditions, not by appeal to the way in which its 
fundamental scientific-physical properties affect viewers’ perceptual systems in the 
two conditions. For, other things being equal, similarly red objects of quite different 
materials look equally red and mauve respectively in these same lighting conditions, 
regardless of the fact that what is going on in scientific-physical terms may be quite 
different; and the scientific-physical changes to such objects that would alter these 
appearances are precisely those that significantly affect the commonsense-physical 
explanatory colour. This, rather than anything specific at the scientific-physical level 
is what unifies the objects that look red and mauve in these respective lighting 
conditions as against those that do not. Thus, commonsense-physical explanations of 
such appearances again have the explanatory virtue of robustness.
5 
 
Having said all this, there is no obvious conflict, so far as I can see, between the 
robustness of commonsense-physical explanations of perceptual appearances of the 
kind involved in (ES), on the one hand, and the equal robustness of fundamental 
scientific-physical explanations of closely related but distinct phenomena, on the 
other. For example, it may well be that the most robust explanation of highly specific 
retinal or neural phenomena involved in our perception of some red objects in some 
circumstances are most robustly explained by appeal to the very specific scientific-
                                                 
5 Notice that in extending the commonsense-physical explanatory picture in this way 
to secondary quality appearances, such as those of an object’s colour, I am explicitly 
rejecting the standard model of the primary vs. secondary quality distinction set out 
above. See, again, Campbell (1993) for discussion and defence of this idea. Note, 
though, that this extension is not essential to the main argument of the current work.  
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physical properties of the light arriving at the eye reflected from the surfaces of such 
objects. That is to say, I see no good reason in what has been said here to deny that 
commonsense-physics and scientific-physics are two perfectly compatible but quite 
distinct explanatory projects, running in parallel, in no real competition, with each 
other. In any case, the key point from this discussion is that commonsense-physical 
explanations have the virtue of robustness over candidate scientific-physical 
explanations in connection with the perceptual appearances that figure in (ES). 
 
This provides an illustration of how and why any blanket explanatory reductionism is 
to be rejected, where this is the crude idea that the best explanation of anything going 
on in the physical world is ultimately to be given in terms of fundamental scientific-
physics. It certainly blocks directly any suggestion, however prima facie plausible, 
that the commonsense physical explanations of perceptual appearances that we began 
with in setting out (ES) are essentially subject to substantive revision by scientific-
physics, in a way that then threatens empiricism as I understand it here. There is no 
such general obligation; and thus, so far at least, such commonsense-physical 
explanations are in perfectly good explanatory standing absolutely as they are. 
 
There may be another worry about their explanatory status, though. For the properties 
of physical objects that are involved sound very much like the perceptual appearances 
that they are invoked to explain. How can the fact that something is red, or round, say, 
be a genuine explanation of the fact that it looks red, or round? It is far from obvious 
what the condition on explanation is supposed to be that is failed by such 
explanations; and we will see again below that the close individuative relation 
between the natures of objects and appearances involved here is crucial to the  
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preservation of empiricism. Still, it is worth emphasizing two points about 
commonsense-physical explanations that should silence this general line of objection. 
First, an object may clearly be F (red, or round, for example) without looking F, 
because it is not seen at all; because although it is seen the subject is attending 
exclusively to certain other features, and so only has eyes for them, as it were; or 
because it is seen in misleading perceptual conditions and so looks G instead. Second, 
an object may look F and yet not be F, again due to any number of variously 
misleading perceptual circumstances. So insofar as the general worry is that there is 
insufficient modal independence between explanans and explanandum for 
commonsense-physical explanations to get any genuine explanatory purchase, then 
this seems to me to be simply false. 
 
I conclude therefore that the commonsense implementation of (ES) suffices as it 
stands to secure realism as defined at the outset. Physical objects are mind-
independent: their nature is entirely independent of their appearance, and not in any 
way a matter of how they do or might appear to anyone. Furthermore, in avoiding the 
need for any substantive revision of commonsense-physical explanations by 
scientific-physics, this version of (ES) avoids the loss of empiricism that I argued 
above comes with any such move. I end by explaining in a little more detail how 
exactly this commonsense implementation also positively secures empiricism. This is 
the second point that I distinguished above: the priority relation between the natures 
of the physical objects that constitute the explanantia of such explanations and the 
appearances that are their explananda ensures in contrast with the scientific 
implementation of (ES) considered earlier that empiricism is preserved. 
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The standard account of primary qualities outlined earlier lies at the heart of the 
commonsense implementation of (ES). According to the current strategy, this model 
applies to all the properties of physical objects and their appearances that figure in 
commonsense explanations of our perceptual experience.
6 That is to say, the natures 
of the perceptual appearances to be explained are characterized precisely as the 
subjective presentation of certain specific and independently individuated properties 
of physical objects in the world around the perceiver. Even in illusory cases, in which 
something that is F looks G, say, the appearance in question transparently presents the 
object as being a specific way that such things may be, although this one is in fact not. 
In the normal veridical case, something’s looking F makes absolutely evident which 
way that very thing out there is. The explanatory ground of that very appearance in its 
mind-independent object’s F-ness itself is entirely transparent to the subject in that 
very experience. Hence physical objects really are the very things that we are 
presented with in experience – our perception of them provides us with at least a 
rough provisional conception of what such physical objects are. Thus the 
commonsense implementation of (ES) also secures empiricism as defined above. 
 
So the mind-independent physical word is the world of the familiar macroscopic 
objects that we all know and love; and those very things are subjectively presented to 
us in perception. The physical objects whose mind-independence is secured by the 
                                                 
6 Note, again, that my inclusion of secondary quality explanations of perceptual 
experience such as (E4)-(E5) above, alongside primary quality explanations such as 
(E1)-(E3), marks a significant departure from orthodoxy by embracing the secondary 
qualities under the familiar primary quality model. See Campbell (1993) for defence 
of this ‘Simple View’.  
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commonsense implementation of (ES) are precisely those that we are genuinely 
presented with in perception. Commonsense (ES) secures empirical realism.
7 
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